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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, many state legislatures and courts have
changed their laws and procedures to improve prosecution of child sex-
ual abuse cases, eliminate evidentiary barriers, and reduce trauma to
child victims in the legal system. These innovative or reform laws have
been in response to two major problems in the criminal justice system's
handling of child sexual abuse cases. First, many cases of child sexual
abuse were not prosecuted due to a lack of physical evidence or eyewit-
nesses and because the sole witness was a child, often considered to be
incompetent or lacking credibility. Second, many began to observe that
* J.D., Antioch School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan. Member of the
Professional Staff of the Center on Children and the Law, American Bar Association,
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children were traumatized by the criminal justice system.
Legal reforms and innovative approaches adopted in the 1980s in-
clude: 1) interdisciplinary teams; 2) a special advocate for the child; 3)
special child abuse prosecution units; 4) elimination of mandatory com-
petency requirements for children; 5) closed-circuit television or vide-
otaping of a child's testimony; 6) expert testimony on the typical be-
haviors of child sexual abuse victims; and 7) special child abuse
hearsay exceptions.
As this law reform movement swept the .country, however, some
questioned their basic need or efficacy, citing a lack of empirical re-
search given the drastic changes in basic trial and legal rights.' Per-
haps the major challenge has been that these innovations, particularly
those involving rules of evidence and trial procedure, violated various
constitutional guarantees, particularly the Sixth Amendment rights of
defendants in criminal trials.2
Most critical analysis and court decisions have addressed whether
the defendant's Sixth Amendment "right to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him" (including the right to cross-examination and phys-
ical confrontation at trial) has been violated by the prosecution's use of
closed-circuit television of a child's testimony outside the defendant's
presence and a child's hearsay statements when the child is not a wit-
ness at trial.' Several of these state court decisions have reached the
United States Supreme Court.4 This article discusses recent Supreme
1. Josephine A. Bulkley, The Impact of New Child Witness Research on Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 212-13 (S. Ceci, D.
Ross & M. Toglia eds. 1989); Gary B. Melton & Ross A. Thompson, Getting Out of a
Rut: Detours to Less Traveled Paths in Child-Witness Research, in CHILDREN'S EYE-
WITNESS MEMORY, 207, 222 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross eds. 1987).
2. Josephine A. Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms, and Emerging Issues in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 6 BEHAV. SC. & L. J. 153 (1988) [hereinafter Bulkley,
Legal Proceedings]; Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay
Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 523 (1988) [hereinafter Graham, The Confrontation Clause]; Josephine A.
Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging
Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645 (1985) [hereinafter
Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends]; Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Relia-
bility and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prose-
cutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985) [hereinafter Graham, Indicia of Reliability].
3. See supra note 2; see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND
PRACTICE (1987 & Supp. 1991).
4. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139
(1990); Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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Court decisions dealing with the constitutionality of admitting chil-
dren's hearsay statements of abuse and closed-circuit television of a
child's testimony under the Confrontation Clause.
II. ADMISSION OF CHILDREN'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS OF
ABUSE UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A child's out-of-court statement of abuse often is the most compel-
ling evidence of sexual abuse besides the child's story on the witness
stand. Such statements often contain more detail than in-court testi-
mony because they were made closer to the abuse experience, are more
spontaneous and have an unrehearsed quality. Because such statements
are hearsay, prosecutors routinely seek to admit children's statements
of abuse under various hearsay exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The rule against hearsay is intended to prevent admission of out-
of-court statements where: 1) there is no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant whose statement is offered by a witness; 2) the statement
was not made under oath; and 3) there was no opportunity for the trier
of fact to observe the declarant's demeanor.' States have adopted nu-
merous hearsay exceptions, however, for admitting statements deemed
to be especially reliable because the declarant is considered to be likely
to be telling the truth.
Hearsay exceptions commonly used in child abuse cases include
the excited utterances or spontaneous declarations exception, exception
for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment,
the residual exception, and the special child abuse exceptions. Approxi-
mately half of the states have adopted a special statutory hearsay ex-
ception for children's out-of-court statements of abuse. The provisions
of most statutes are similar because they were drafted to comply with
the confrontation requirements set forth in Ohio v. Roberts7 and the
constitutionality of statutes with these requirements have been upheld
by state appellate courts.8
5. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 (1972).
6. Debra Whitcomb, When the Victim Is a Child: Issues for Judges and Prose-
cutors (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2d ed. 1992) (forthcoming);
Ross Eatman & Josephine A. Bulkley, Protecting Child/Victim Witnesses: Sample
Laws and Materials 13-15, 53 (A.B.A. 1986).
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
923 (1989); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); State v. Wright,
751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1985); State
1992]
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The original purpose of the child abuse exceptions was to provide a
means of admitting a child's statement of abuse that did not fit the
strict or narrow requirements of existing hearsay exceptions., A num-
ber of state courts have broadly interpreted the excited utterances ex-
ception beyond its purpose by allowing, for example, statements to be
v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (en banc).
Several state supreme courts have held that their statutory child abuse exceptions
violate the doctrine of separation of powers in that the legislature has adopted a rule of
evidence that, under the state constitution, is a power delegated to the judiciary. See,
e.g., Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990); Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d
1338 (Miss. 1989); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc). For exam-
ple, this was the holding in Drumm v. Commonwealth in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court found that because the Kentucky Constitution vests the judiciary with the power
to adopt rules of practice and procedure for the courts, the statute creating a child
abuse hearsay exception is "an unconstitutional exercise of rule-making power by the
General Assembly." 783 S.W.2d at 382. The court further held that,
we will not extend comity to this statute because it fails the test of a 'stat-
utorily acceptable' substitute for current judicially mandated procedures.
Fundamental guarantees to the criminally accused of due process and con-
frontation, established by both the United States and Kentucky Constitu-
tions, are transgressed by a statute purporting to permit conviction based
on hearsay where no traditionally acceptable and applicable reasons for
exceptions apply.
Id.
Most child abuse hearsay exceptions provide that a statement may be admitted if
the child testifies, or in cases where the child does not testify, the prosecution has
demonstrated that the child is "unavailable to testify," and the statement possesses
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness (some require trustworthiness only if the
child does not testify, while others require it both when the child testifies and does not
testify). Whitcomb, supra note 6, cites Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Kansas and New York in a chart with statutory citations as not requiring an unavaila-
bility showing if the child is not produced to testify, however.
Some statutes require an additional showing of corroborative evidence of the abuse
when the child does not testify. Whitcomb cites ten states that require corroboration.
Some legislation sets out factors the court may consider in deciding whether a state-
ment is trustworthy. According to Whitcomb, supra note 6, at least three states list
reliability factors.
At least one state statute requires that expert testimony support an unavailability
finding based upon emotional trauma to the child. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6
(1984) (as cited in Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2, at 649-
57).
9. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2, at 649-57;
Josephine A. Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court
Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 153 (J.
Bulkley ed., 1981).
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admitted that had been made days, weeks, or even months after the
sexually abusive event. 10 Other courts, however, have excluded reliable
statements of children because more than a few minutes or hours had
elapsed since the statement had been made.11
The medical diagnosis and treatment exception is also available
and has been liberally interpreted by some courts to encompass chil-
dren's statements of sexual abuse to mental health professionals as well
as medical doctors. 12 Too often, however, courts have found that its
requirements are not satisfied, thus preventing admission into evidence
many statements children make to doctors or mental health
professionals."3
Some states have adopted the "residual exception," an exception
also included in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 14 Considered a "catch-
all" exception, it permits statements to be admitted that do not fit the
requirements of a traditional exception, but nonetheless possess circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to traditional excep-
tions. Other requirements must also be met.
The residual exception serves the same purpose as the child abuse
exceptions by permitting admission of statements that do not fit the
strict requirements of traditional hearsay exceptions. Some have argued
that as a legal policy matter, the residual exception is preferable to the
child abuse exceptions, because it has broader application and does not
carve out an exception for a narrow class of statements while including
virtually the same requirements as the residual exception.'6 A number
of courts have admitted child abuse statements under this exception,
although some courts, including the United States Supreme Court in
Idaho v. Wright,'6 have found that the child's statement did not possess
such guarantees of trustworthiness.
10. Id.; MYERS, supra note 3, John E.B. Myers, Hearsay Statements by the
Child Abuse Victim, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 776, 863-65 (1986).
!i. Id.
12. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Pur-
pose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989); MYERS, supra
note 3, at 360-72 (1987), 198-204 (Supp. 1991).
13. Id.
14. MYERS, supra note 3, at 360-62. See generally Bulkley, supra note 9; Whit-
comb, supra note 6.
15. See Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories supra note 9.
16. 110 S. Ct. at 3141.
19921
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III. ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS WHEN THE CHILD DOES NOT
TESTIFY AT TRIAL
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been in-
terpreted as a rule of preference for "face-to-face confrontation at
trial," requiring the "personal presence of the witness at trial, enabling
the trier to observe his demeanor as an aid in evaluating his credibility
and making false accusations more unlikely because of the presence of
the accused and the solemnity of the occasion. '"17
When a prosecutor offers into evidence a child's statement and the
child testifies, no confrontation problem is presented, since the defend-
ant has an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the child about
his or her out-of-court statements. When the child is not a witness,
however, admission of the child's out-of-court statement has been chal-
lenged as a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion rights.
Under Supreme Court decisions prior to 1986, if the child was not
a witness at trial, even if his or her out-of-court statement of abuse
satisfied the requirements of a hearsay exception, its admissibility
under the Confrontation Clause was not certain. Under recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the admission of hearsay and the Confron-
tation Clause, however, it appears that if a statement satisfies a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it also satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
There are five relevant Supreme Court decisions since 1980 dealing
with hearsay and the Confrontation Clause: White v. Ilinois,8 Idaho
v. Wright,' 9 Bourjaily v. United States,2" Inadi v. United States," and
Ohio v. Roberts.22
Idaho v. Wright was a 1990 decision dealing with a young child's
statements of sexual abuse to a physician under the residual exception.
The Court summarized the relationship it long has described between
the hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause, as well as two requirements
many believed were constitutional prerequisites to the admission of any
hearsay:
Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Con-
17. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252, at 606 (1972).
18. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
19. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
20. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
21. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
22. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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frontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,
we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's
prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of
hearsay statements. The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars
the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In Ohio v. Roberts, we set forth "a general approach" for de-
termining when incriminating statements admissible under an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule meet the requirements of the Confron-
tation Clause . . . . First, in conformance with the Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment es-
tablishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case . . ., the prosecution
must either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the de-
clarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Relia-
bility can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness. 8
A. The Unavailability Requirement
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts,
which involved an absent witness' preliminary hearing testimony, held:
"In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he
is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate indicia of reliability."24
Despite this language which was reiterated by the Court ten years
later in Idaho v. Wright, it was not certain that the Court intended to
require a showing of unavailability for all exceptions, since most do not
expressly include such a requirement.25 Indeed, in 1986 United States
23. 110 S. Ct. at 3146 (citations omitted).
24. 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
25. Graham, Indicia of Reliability, supra note 2, at 53-55. Graham states that
after Roberts,
[tlaken literally, almost every hearsay statement that meets an exception
in Rule 803 . . .would seem to require either production of the declarant,
or a showing of unavailability before the statement can be received in evi-
dence against the accused.
19921
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v. Inadi was decided, in which the Supreme Court held that the general
requirement of unavailability does not apply to out-of-court statements
made by a non-testifying co-conspirator.2 6 Although Idaho v. Wright
indicated the Court has "applied the general approach articulated in
Roberts to subsequent cases raising Confrontation and hearsay is-
sues," 27 Inadi (as well as a footnote in Roberts itself) makes it clear
that the Supreme Court did not mean to impose an unavailability re-
quirement for all hearsay exceptions. 8
Inadi noted that if the Roberts requirements applied to all hear-
say, "no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a showing
of unavailability . . . . Roberts, however, does not stand for such a
wholesale revision of the law of evidence . The Court further
stated:
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered,
the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these indicate that
Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule . . . . that applies
[an] unavailability analysis to prior testimony. Roberts cannot
fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-
court statement can be introduced by the government without a
showing that the declarant is unavailable."
Because state courts were unsure after Inadi whether unavailabil-
ity applied to other exceptions, decisions went both ways.3 1 The effect
Several factors, however, indicate that the Supreme Court did not
contemplate such radical change in practice.
Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
26. 475 U.S. at 393-94.
27. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
29. 475 U.S. at 392.
30. Id. at 394.
31. Some courts have not required unavailability in a child abuse cases. See Nel-
son v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark.
1987); People v. Lusk, 267 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); People v. White, 555
N.E.2d 1241 (I11. Ct. App. 1990), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); State v. Borland, 786
P.2d 810 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 793 P.2d 974 (1990).
Courts that have required a showing of unavailability in a child abuse case in-
clude: People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); State v. Allen, 755
P.2d 1153 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc); In re Tina K., 568 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989);
State v. Sorenson, 449 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
In some child abuse cases, courts holding that unavailability is not required have
focused on the first Inadi factor with little or no attention to the other factors. These
[Vol. 16
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of Inadi was articulated by the concurring opinion in Nelson v. Farrey,
which indicated:
The Inadi decision has created an unfortunate vacuum in the Con-
frontation Clause realm, for at present it is not clear if a showing
of unavailability is required for most types of hearsay statements.
Given its broadest construction, Inadi stands for the proposition
that the unavailability of the declarant is a relevant constitutional
factor only when the hearsay statements involve testimony given at
a preliminary hearing. In my view, however, Inadi does not re-
present a repudiation of Roberts' unavailability discussion. Rather,
...Inadi merely reaffirms and applies the Roberts principle that a
showing of unavailability is not required in all situations (citations
omitted). Thus, . . . Inadi represents a directive to lower courts to
carefully analyze the facts of a given situation before concluding
that a showing of unavailability is constitutionally required. 2
After Inadi, Professor Graham noted that just as Roberts does not
mean that an unavailability showing is required for all hearsay excep-
tions, Inadi probably does not mean that an unavailability showing is
never required.," Citing the Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Green,' Graham states: "If the right of confrontation never compels
the prosecution to provide available witnesses, it cannot serve its histor-
ical function of preventing 'flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accus-
ers, and absentee witnesses.' ""
Nevertheless, in January, 1992, the Supreme Court decided White
v. Illinois,6 holding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by
admission of a four-year old's statements of sexual abuse, although the
child did not testify at trial. The defendant was convicted based solely
on testimony from the child's mother, babysitter, a doctor, a nurse and
decisions reasoned that the child's out-of-court statements, like a co-conspirator's out-
of-court statement, are likely to be very different from the child's trial testimony, and
the statement therefore constitutes irreplaceable evidence. For example, Johnson v.
State involved admission of a child's statement of sexual abuse under a child abuse
exception that does not contain an unavailability requirement. 732 S.W.2d 817 (Ark.
1987). The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that a child sexual abuse victim may later
recant, indicating a strong possibility that a child's earlier statement will be different
from her trial testimony. Id. at 823.
32. 874 F.2d at 1231.
33. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 579.
34. 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970).
35. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583.
36. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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a police officer who described what the child told them about the abuse.
The statements were admitted under the state's spontaneous declara-
tions and medical diagnosis and treatment exceptions. Although it is
not known why, the prosecution did not offer the child as a witness, and
the court did not hold a hearing or make a finding that she was un-
available to testify (and the child apparently was in the courtroom).
In White, the Court essentially followed its reasoning in Inadi.
The Court reiterated three major reasons for not imposing an unavaila-
bility requirement for the spontaneous declarations and medical diag-
nosis exceptions.3 7 First, unlike former testimony, which is a weaker
form of live testimony, statements under these exceptions have indepen-
dent evidentiary significance, are made in a context very different from
trial, and like co-conspirator statements, "are usually irreplaceable as
substantive evidence." 38 Moreover, in White, the Court indicated that
spontaneous declarations and medical diagnosis statements are made in
"contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their
trustworthiness. "3
Second, the Court indicated in Inadi and White that there is little
benefit to the unavailability rule, since the statements are admissible
whether the declarant is unavailable, or available and produced by the
prosecution. Inadi stated that nothing is excluded "unless the prosecu-
tion makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available wit-
ness." 40 Inadi further noted that the unavailability rule is not particu-
larly useful because it is not likely to produce much testimony that
adds to the truth-determining process, "[since] presumably only those
declarants that neither side believes will be particularly helpful will not
have been subpoenaed as witnesses."' 1 Both White and Inadi stated
that the defendant can subpoena those witnesses not called by the state.
Third, White and Inadi found that the unavailability rule places signifi-
cant and additional burdens on the criminal justice system and fact-
finding process. 2
Most importantly, the White opinion indicated: "[W]here prof-
fered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to come
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception to the hearsay rule, the Con-
37. Id. at 738.
38. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
39. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
40. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
41. Id. at 397.
42. Id. at 398.
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frontation Clause is satisfied." 3 This statement is significant, because
as noted above, the Court has previously refused to equate the Con-
frontation Clause with the hearsay rule, indicating that some evidence
admissible under a hearsay exception is excluded by the Confrontation
Clause. Yet White signifies the end of this principle for firmly rooted
exceptions. Idaho v. Wright made it clear that if a statement satisfies a
firmly rooted exception, the reliability requirement is satisfied; after
White, if a statement satisfies a firmly rooted exception, the Confronta-
tion Clause is satisfied. For exceptions that are not firmly rooted, how-
ever, such as the residual and child abuse exceptions, White leaves open
whether unavailability would be required by the Confrontation Clause.
As noted above, some child abuse exceptions do not require unavaila-
bility 44 and the residual exception does not have an unavailability
requirement.
Although the White case settles an uncertain constitutional issue,
its practical impact may not be great. First, there are few cases in
which the prosecution would not want a child to testify unless she was
in fact "unavailable" (for example due to severe trauma, absolute re-
fusal to testify, or incompetency). Most prosecutors believe that a
child's live testimony is critical to obtaining a conviction. Indeed, in the
past, courts' failure to find children competent as witnesses frequently
resulted in cases that were dismissed or not prosecuted.
Second, even in cases where a child may be traumatized or refuse
to testify, prosecutors are likely to attempt options such as closed-cir-
cuit television or excluding the public from the courtroom to enable the
child to testify outside the presence of the defendant or public. The
Supreme Court has indicated such approaches are not unconstitutional
if necessity for their use (for example, due to emotional distress of the
child) is shown on a case-by-case basis.45 The use of these innovations
is preferred to having no witness at all.
The effect of White generally will be to relieve the state from prov-
ing that a child who is unable to testify is "unavailable." There also
may be occasions where prosecutors seek to admit a child's out-of-court
statements without having the child testify, but be unable to prove the
child is "unavailable to testify." It is in these situations that the un-
availability rule would prevent admission of a child's out-of-court state-
43. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
44. See supra note 8.
45. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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ments unless the child is called by the prosecution to testify. Without
either the child as a witness or his or her out-of-court statements, the
prosecution would likely fail.
One such situation is where parents do not allow their child to
testify because of fear of causing the child emotional distress, although
there would be insufficient evidence of emotional trauma to satisfy the
unavailability requirement. A recent California case allowed the admis-
sion of a child's hearsay statements without requiring a showing of un-
availability, where the child was not a witness because his father would
not allow him to testify.46
A second situation is where a prosecutor has a case with excellent
testimony from several adults as to what the child told them (as in
White v. Illinois) and perhaps other evidence of sexual abuse. The
child witness, although competent and not likely to be severely trauma-
tized by testifying, may not be a credible or sympathetic witness, par-
ticularly if the case involves a very young child and a good defense
attorney likely to impeach the child's credibility because of his or her
young age. The prosecution may prefer not to have the child testify for
fear of hurting its case.
Lastly, although in most jurisdictions it may not be difficult to es-
tablish emotional trauma to satisfy the unavailability requirement,
some courts may require very high thresholds for demonstrating emo-
tional distress. For example, on remand to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v.
Craig, the Maryland court reaffirmed its first holding in Craig v. Mary-
land"7 establishing a strict standard for a finding of emotional distress.
It should be emphasized that White does not mean that the prose-
cution can prevent an available child from testifying, since the defend-
ant can call the child for cross-examination. If the child is truly availa-
ble, the state should be required to produce the child; if the child is not
produced, the prosecution then should be required to show that the
child was unavailable (e.g., due to incompetency, trauma or refusal to
communicate). Whether defendants will exercise their right to call the
child to testify remains to be seen. Defendants may hesitate for fear of
alienating the jury by forcing the child to testify and causing him or
her distress and creating hostility toward the defendant.
Indeed, in some states, under a statute allowing admission of a
child's videotaped statement, prosecutors routinely have offered a
46. Lusk, 267 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1990).
47. 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
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child's videotaped statement in lieu of the child's direct testimony,
making the child available for cross-examination. Most courts have
held that this procedure does not violate the defendant's confrontation
rights a; long as the child is made available for cross-examination (al-
though others have held that the Confrontation Clause is violated by
failing to allow cross-examination at the time the statement was
taken)." ' Often, defendants have not called the child to testify for fear
of creating sympathy for the child."'
Indeed, in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in United States v.
Inadi, he noted that the defendant's right to call the declarant himself
does not satisfy confrontation since "the Confrontation Clause gives a
defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, not
merely an opportunity to seek out witnesses on his own."'50 Justice
48. Cases holding that confrontation is not violated by admission of a videotaped
statement in lieu of the child's direct testimony as long as the child is available for
cross-examination include: State v. Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 976 (1992); State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 461 N.W.2d 444 (1990); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind.
1987); State v. Feazell, 486 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Johnson, 729
P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1986).
Both Texas and Tennessee courts have found that their statutes violated the Con-
frontation Clause. State v. Pilkey, 776 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). Texas' highest court in criminal cases in 1987 held that the
Confrontation Clause is violated by admission of a videotaped interview without the
prosecution offering the child for direct and cross-examination, or not allowing for
cross-examination at the time the interview is given. Long, 742 S.W.2d at 320. The
court indicated: "The courts of this state and country have never had to confront and
review a trial procedure that requires the defendant to call as a witness his accuser if
he wants to question the witness." Id. at 320. A more recent case, however, held that
the Texas statute was not, on its face, unconstitutional, but that it must be constitution-
ally applied as set forth in Long; i.e., requiring the state to call the child to testify on
direct examination.) See Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
49. See, e.g., Schaal, 806 S.W.2d at 663-64; Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d at 589;
Long, 742 S.W.2d at 315; Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583-
84. Steven Chaney, Videotaped Interviews with Child Abuse Victims, Papers from a
National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases (A.B.A.
1985); Ross Eatman, Videotaping Interviews with Child Sexual Offense Victims, 7
CHILDRErN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 13 (1986).
50. 475 U. S. at 406. Marshall first indicated that: "Roberts consciously sought
to lay down an analytical framework applicable to all out-of-court declarations intro-
duced by the prosecution for the truth they contain." Id. at 402-03. This point is sup-
ported by language in Idaho v. Wright which cites Roberts in setting out both the
unavailability and reliability requirements. Second, Marshall pointed out that extraju-
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Marshall further stated that requiring the defendant to call declarants
as his witnesses "may deny the defendant certain tactical advantages
vouchsafed him by the Confrontation Clause. ' 51
Graham noted that Inadi represented a departure from the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions (including Dutton v. Evans and Ohio v.
Roberts) that indicate confrontation requires the prosecution to call an
available witness whose testimony is crucial or devastating at trial for
examination and cross-examination by the defense. 2 White appears to
represent an even further erosion of this confrontation requirement. Be-
cause the child victim's testimony is so important, it seems hard to im-
agine that the prosecution constitutionally may present the accusatory
hearsay statements of an available yet non-testifying child declarant,
leaving it to the defendant to call the child for cross-examination.
In conclusion, hopefully White will not create the specter of prose-
cutors routinely deciding not to call a child, the primary accusatory
witness, despite his or her ability to testify, instead relying on other
evidence of the abuse, and defendants not calling the child for fear of
alienating the jury. On the other hand, lack of an unavailability rule
may benefit children by permitting some prosecutions that otherwise
could not go forward, without significantly abridging defendant's con-
frontation rights. It is hoped that White simply makes it unnecessary
for the state to prove a child is unavailable when he or she is actually
unable to testify, since prosecutors generally need the child as a wit-
ness. In those few cases where the prosecutor fails to produce a child
who may be available to testify, defendants hopefully will exercise their
right to call the child.
B. The Reliability Requirement
The Court held in Bourjaily v. United States583 that because the
co-conspirator exception is firmly rooted, an independent inquiry into
the reliability of a co-conspirator's statement is not required."' Af-
firming its holding in Roberts and Bourjaily, Idaho v. Wright in 1990
stated: "Admission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the
dicial statements may still be admitted if, in good faith, the prosecution is unable to
produce the declarant. Id. at 406.
51. Id. at 408.
52. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, supra note 2, at 583.
53. 483 U.S. 171 (1990).
54. Id. at 183.
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constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded
longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trust-
worthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements."55
If a statement does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, how-
ever, the Court has found that it is presumptively unreliable, but never-
theless may be admitted if supported by a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."'56 In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme
Court held that the residual exception is not firmly rooted. Moreover,
the child abuse exceptions also would not be considered firmly rooted.
Therefore, under the residual and child abuse exceptions, the prosecu-
tion must demonstrate a statement's trustworthiness.
In assessing the trustworthiness of the statements in Wright, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the Idaho Supreme Court's "ap-
parently dispositive weight . . . on the lack of procedural safeguards at
the interview, 57 which included the doctor's failure to videotape the
interview, use of leading questions and preconceived idea of the child's
disclosures. The Court refused to "read into the Confrontation Clause a
preconceived and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of
professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements
against a defendant."58
Numerous courts have found that a child's statement of abuse was
sufficiently trustworthy to meet the requirements of both the particular
hearsay exception involved as well as the Confrontation Clause.5 9
Wright cited a number of federal and state cases which the Court indi-
cated identify factors that "properly relate to whether hearsay state-
ments made by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are relia-
ble."60 Wright indicated that it would not "endorse a mechanical test
for determining 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Rather,
the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child
was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was
made." 61 The Court upheld the approach of determining the trustwor-
thiness of a particular statement by examining "the totality of the cir-
55. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147.
56. Id. at 3152.
57. Id. at 3148.
58. Id.
59. See the cases cited in Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. See also MYERS,
supra note 3, at 362-71 (1987), 207-14 (Supp. 1991), for a list of factors and cases
regarding reliability.
60. 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (citations omitted).
61. Id.
1992]
15
Bulkley: Recent Supreme Court Decisions Ease Child Abuse Prosecutions: Use
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
cumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render
the declarant particularly worthy of belief."62
Nevertheless, Idaho v. Wright found that the two and half year
old's statements to a physician did not possess particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The Court
noted: "Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
younger daughter's responses to Dr. Jambura's questions, we find no
special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were
particularly trustworthy. ' 63 Concerned with the suggestive manner of
the doctor's interview, the Court also indicated that the statement was
not made in circumstances of reliability similar to those required for
excited utterances or statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. The
Court held:
Given the presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory hear-
say statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, we agree with the court below that the state failed to
show that the younger daughter's incriminating statements to the
pediatrician possessed sufficient 'particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness under the Confrontation Clause to overcome that
presumption."' 4
In conclusion, after Wright, a statement that falls within a firmly
rooted exception is presumed reliable for confrontation purposes. For
exceptions that are not firmly rooted, a statement's trustworthiness
must be proven. While many statements may satisfy a hearsay excep-
tion or the Confrontation Clause trustworthiness requirement, some, as
in Wright, may not.
IV. CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION OR VIDEOTAPING OF A
CHILD'S TESTIMONY OUTSIDE THE DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
As noted earlier, over the last decade, more than half the states
have adopted legislation permitting alternative testimonial procedures,
primarily in criminal proceedings for child abuse victims.66 Most stat-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 3152.
64. Id. at 3152-53.
65. DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS (Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, Office of Develop-
ment, Testing, and Dissemination 1985); Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 6. Brief of
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utes permit a child to testify in another room outside the presence of
the defendant, judge, jury and public, and to have her testimony either
televised into the courtroom during trial or videotaped prior to trial.66
Since the mid-1980s, however, numerous court decisions have ad-
dressed the question of whether the use of "one-way" television or vide-
otaping, in which the child testifies outside the physical presence of the
defendant, violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confron-
tation. 17 These laws also have been challenged as violating other consti-
tutional guarantees, including the defendant's right to a public and a
jury trial, Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial and right to
self-representation, and due process rights.6 8
It was not until 1990, in a case called Maryland v. Craig,6 9 that
the United States Supreme Court finally decided that the Confronta-
tion Clause does not preclude the elimination of a face-to-face meeting
between the child and defendant as long as it is necessary to achieve an
important public policy such as protecting a child witness from the
trauma of testifying in the defendant's presence. In 1988, in an earlier
case that reached the Supreme Court, Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court
declined to decide whether face-to-face confrontation could give way to
protecting a child witness in a case involving use of a screen in the
courtroom to prevent the child from having to view the defendant dur-
ing her testimony. 70
In Coy, the Court did not reach the face-to-face confrontation is-
sue because it found the defendant's confrontation right had been vio-
lated by an Iowa statute that failed to require a threshold finding that
the screen was "necessary to further an important public policy. ' 71
Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); INVES-
TIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE PROSECU-
TION OF CHILD ABUSE, AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (P. Toth & M.
Whalen eds. 1987).
66. See supra note 65.
67. MYERS, supra note 3.
68. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 2; Josephine A.
Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Review of Child Sexual Abuse Law Reforms
in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 5 (1985); MYERS, supra note 3, at 245-50.
69. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
70. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
71. Like the Iowa statute, some state statutes do not require a finding of neces-
sity. Although some courts have found such statutes unconstitutional, see, e.g., State v.
Murphy, 542 So.2d 1373 (La. 1989), others have made a determination that use of
such procedures may be permitted as long as the court finds it necessary to protect a
particular child witness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky.
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Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that face-to-face confrontation
constituted the irreducible, literal meaning of the clause, and that if it
could be abridged, it could only be done after individualized findings by
the Court that a particular witness needs protection.
Following the Coy decision, state courts were still left with the
unanswered question of whether physical confrontation could be elimi-
nated if a showing of necessity were made. Many state appellate courts
followed the O'Connor and White concurring opinion in Coy,72 (later
adopted by the Craig majority), indicating that protection of child wit-
nesses is an important public policy, and procedures for protecting a
child from the trauma of testifying in court or the defendant's presence
may be used if the trial court makes a case-specific finding of necessity.
Even before Coy, this was the holding of most state court decisions.73
In Maryland v. Craig, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices, led by Justice O'Connor, held that protection of a child witness
constitutes an important public policy which, upon a proper showing of
necessity, justifies an exception to face-to-face confrontation. The
United States Supreme Court agreed with the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-
being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh,
at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in
court. '7 The Court held:
[I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying
in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to tes-
tify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face con-
1986) (decided in 1986 before both Coy and Craig).
72. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 777 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1989); State v. Conklin, 444
N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989); State v. Tafoya, 765 P.2d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). See
MYERS, supra note 3, at 238-40, for a list of cases.
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); State v.
Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1987); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941 (La. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Turner v. State, 716
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984); see also Josephine A. Bulkley, After Coy v. Iowa: The Status of
Videotaping, Closed-Circuit Television and Other Methods for Taking A Child's Tes-
timony Outside the Defendant's Presence, in The Fourth National Conference on Chil-
dren and the Law, National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection
292 (A.B.A. 1988); Eatman & Bulkley, supra note 1, at 56-60.
74. 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
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frontation with the defendant.7 5
Furthermore, the Craig case set forth broad guidelines for a show-
ing of necessity. Coy did not elaborate on "individualized findings of
necessity." Before Craig, some decisions required a finding of trauma
to the child specifically caused by the defendant's presence, 76 although
many state court decisions suggested that a finding of trauma to the
child from testifying in open court was sufficient. Many decisions prior
to Craig also held that expert testimony or testimony from lay wit-
nesses, such as parents, regarding trauma to the child satisfied the ne-
cessity requirement.7 Some courts indicated that the judge should ob-
serve or question the child to determine whether she would be
traumatized.
In many cases, the child may begin testifying in the usual manner
but "freeze up" or break down on the witness stand, which courts have
cited as justification for use of videotaping or closed-circuit television.
Some courts specifically have required questioning of the child in the
defendant's presence in order to determine whether the accused's pres-
ence intimidated or traumatized the child.78 One of these cases was
Craig v. State, 9 in which the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
while there are valid exceptions to face-to-face confrontation,
a statutory inquiry which looks generally to a child's inability to
testify in open court [is] . . . too broad to satisfy the necessity re-
75. Id. at 3169.
76. Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990) (showing of impact of testify-
ing in defendant's presence required); State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150 (Ariz. 1989);
State v. Jarzbek, 554 A.2d 1094 (Conn. 1989); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268
(Minn. 1989) (statute requires determination that presence of defendant would psycho-
logically traumatize the child making her unavailable to testify); State v. Thomas, 442
N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1989) (preliminary hearing testimony of child who was unable to
communicate in defendant's presence sufficient showing of trauma); State v. Darby,
563 A.2d 710 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); State v. Albert, 778 P.2d 386 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Crandall, 555 A.2d 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (lack of finding by trial
court that child would experience distress from testifying in the defendant's presence).
See Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md. 1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990),
for other cases that mention the effect of the defendant on the child's testimony.
77. State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112 (Conn.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989);
McGuire v. State, 706 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1986).
78. Craig, 560 A.2d at 1122; Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591
(Mass. 1989); State v. Thomas, 442 N.W.2d 10 (Wis.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 867
(1989); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
79. 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), vacated 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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quirement [and] whether a child is unavailable to testify in the
Roberts sense should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in
the ordinary courtroom setting, but in the much narrower terms of
the witness' inability to testify in the presence of the accused. 80
The court indicated the child must be questioned by the judge (either
in or out of the courtroom) in the defendant's presence to determine if
she is unable to reasonably communicate because of serious emotional
distress produced by the defendant's presence. The court also required
that two-way television, a less restrictive alternative, must be attempted
prior to use of a one-way procedure.
The Supreme Court imposed three minimal requirements to satisfy
the necessity showing: 1) there must be a case-specific finding of neces-
sity; 2) the trauma to the child must be caused by the defendant's pres-
ence, not just courtroom trauma; and 3) the emotional distress must be
"more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement
or some reluctance to testify ... ."I The Supreme Court found that
the Maryland statute, which requires a finding that the child will suffer
"serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably
communicate," met constitutional standards.
The Supreme Court, in addressing how necessity must be estab-
lished, disagreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals' requirements
that the child must be questioned in the defendant's presence and two-
way television must first be attempted. The Supreme Court refused "to
establish, as a matter of federal constitutional law, any such categorical
evidentiary prerequisites for the use of one-way television procedure."82
The Court indicated that the trial court could have found that expert
testimony was sufficient to establish that the children's testimony in the
defendant's presence would result in serious emotional distress.
Craig made it clear that preserving safeguards of adverseness and
reliability, including the oath, cross-examination, and observation of
the witness' demeanor by the jury, judge and defendant, renders use of
a one-way procedure "functionally equivalent to . . . live, in-person
testimony."83 Craig noted that such assurances of reliability and ad-
verseness "are far greater than those required for admission of hearsay
80. Id. at 1126.
81. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 3171.
83. Id. at 3166.
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testimony under the Confrontation Clause."84
The effect of Craig should be to affirm the status quo, since most
state appellate courts prior to Craig had permitted use of one-way pro-
cedures for children found to be traumatized by testifying at trial. In-
deed, during the past year since Craig was decided, a number of deci-
sions have allowed one-way closed-circuit television or videotaped
depositions based on the Craig decision where the requirements were
met.85 Some courts, however, have held that the defendant's right of
confrontation was violated where specific findings of necessity were not
made or other similar requirements were not satisfied.8 In deciding
whether to request protective procedures in future cases, prosecutors
should consider carefully whether trauma to the child would be caused
specifically by the defendant's presence as opposed to testifying in
court. If it appears a child may suffer distress from testifying in the
courtroom, other alternatives where the defendant remains physically
present could be considered, such as closing the courtroom to the gen-
eral public (although other constitutional guarantees must be examined
when considering such approaches, too) or using a videotaped deposi-
tion prior to trial in which the defendant is present.
Moreover, some courts may establish stricter requirements than
Maryland v. Craig such as requiring two-way closed-circuit television
or the child to be questioned in the defendant's presence to determine if
84. Id. at 3167.
85. Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Guenther,
754 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1991); Government of V.I. v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 727
(D.V.I. 1991); United States v. Thompson, 31 M.J. 168 (C.M.A. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 956 (1991); Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); State
v. Crandall, 577 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1990); State v. Self, 564 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1990); In
re G.T., 588 A.2d 621 (Vt. 1991); State v. Lamb, 798 P.2d 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990);
In re Vanidestine, 463 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Guce, 560
N.Y.S.2d 53 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 524 (1990).
Some state courts also have held that the right of confrontation is not violated
when a child's testimony is videotaped by deposition before trial where the defendant is
present during the deposition. Although obvious, courts indicate that the defendant's
face-to-face confrontation right has not been abrogated, and they also hold that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated although the jury is unable to observe the child's
demeanor at the time she testifies. Hardy v. Wigginton, 922 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1990);
Vigil v. Tansy, 917 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 995 (1991);
People v. Schmitt, 562 N.E.2d 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d
154 (1991).
86. E.g., State v. Peters, 587 A.2d 587 (N.H. 1991); Edwards v. State, 568 So.
2d 123 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); D.A.D. v. State, 566 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
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she would be traumatized. In fact, some state statutes permit only
"two-way" closed-circuit television, 8 in which the child is able to see
the defendant on a monitor in the room where he or she is testifying
and another monitor televises the child's testimony in the courtroom.
The Supreme Court merely established minimum, threshold require-
ments for allowing one-way television below which state courts may not
go.
Indeed, after the Supreme Court remanded Craig to the Maryland
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier holding es-
tablishing a strict standard for a finding of emotional distress.88 The
Supreme Court remanded the case because it wanted to give the Mary-
land court an opportunity to reconsider its earlier ruling, since its first
decision was made before the Supreme Court had addressed the con-
frontation issue. The first Maryland Court of Appeals Craig decision
interpreted the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Coy v. Iowa (which
did not decide whether face-to-face confrontation was required) as es-
tablishing a "high threshold" for a finding of necessity, which the Ma-
ryland appeals court indicated the trial court had not met.
The Supreme Court stated in Maryland v. Craig that "we cannot
be certain whether the Court of Appeals would reach the same conclu-
sion in light of the legal standard we establish today."8 Nevertheless,
in the second Craig v. Maryland0 decision, the Court of Appeals again
held that the judge should question the child personally, preferably in
the defendant's presence, although indicating such an approach was
discretionary rather than mandatory. Additionally, in direct contrast to
the United States Supreme Court, the Maryland court stated that ex-
pert testimony, while permissible, was generally not sufficient to estab-
lish emotional trauma.91
Some state courts also may decide that one-way television violates
a defendant's right of confrontation under their state constitution giv-
ing defendants the right to a "face-to-face" meeting with witnesses
against them.92 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that it was
unnecessary to decide the federal confrontation question because its de-
87. Whitcomb, supra note 1.
88. Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
89. 110 S. Ct. at 3171.
90. 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991).
91. Id. at 332.
92. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594
A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
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cision was based on the state constitution. The court further indicated
that it never has been bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
similar federal constitutional provisions.
Both the Indiana and Pennsylvania courts stated that the words
"face-to-face" distinguish their state's Confrontation Clause from the
federal Constitution (which requires the defendant to "be confronted
with the witnesses against him""3 ). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that because the child was not unavailable or had not been subject
to cross-examination in the presence of the accused during prior testi-
mony, the defendant's state confrontation right was violated. 4
V. CONCLUSION
From Globe Newspaper in 1981 to White v. Illinois in 1992, pros-
ecutors have received favorable treatment in child sexual abuse cases.
The Craig and White decisions clearly indicate the Court is willing to
make exceptions to the defendant's confrontation rights in cases involv-
ing sexual abuse of a child. Yet these decisions are not merely indica-
tive of the Court's view of child victims, but illustrate their preference
in general for the prosecution's position in criminal cases. Moreover,
although the Court has allowed exceptions in child abuse cases, it has
not meant that defendants' confrontation rights completely have been
abrogated.
In practice, most cases of child sexual abuse never reach the trial
stage. More importantly, in such cases of abuse that go to trial, prose-
cutors want and need a live child witness. It is only in the exceptional
case when a particular child cannot testify at all or cannot testify in
open court or in front of the accused-because he or she would be too
traumatized or refuses to communicate-that evidentiary methods such
as closed-circuit television or admission of the child's out-of-court state-
ments make it possible for prosecutors to initiate or win prosecutions
that otherwise would fail.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 284-85.
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